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Abstract 
With this article, we would like to initiate a discussion about a methodological 
problem that is central to many empirical science studies but has received far too 
little attention, namely scientifically informed interviewing. To what extent do we 
have to understand scientists’ work scientifically in order to explain their behav-
iour sociologically? As far as it is existent at all, the methodological debate in sci-
ence studies has focused on ethnographic observations. In this debate, the two ap-
proaches of naïve observation and informed observation (which sometimes takes 
the form of native observation) can be distinguished. The general methodology of 
ethnographic observation clearly favours the informed approach, as does the gen-
eral methodology of qualitative interviewing. ‘Scientifically informed interviewing’ 
specifies this general methodological insight for science studies but is also neces-
sary because in some investigations we must systematically collect data on the con-
tent of our respondents’ research. This kind of interviewing requires extensive 
preparation of interviews, the construction of an ‘ad hoc – pidgin’ for the commu-
nication during the interview and the negotiation of an appropriate level of scien-
tific depth between the interviewer and the interviewee. We make suggestions how 
to solve these tasks (and how not to) and discuss limitations of the approach of 
informed interviewing. 
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1 Do we need to understand 
science? 
With this article, we propose a discus-
sion about a methodological problem 
and its practical consequences for in-
terviewing scientists.1 To what extent 
do we have to understand scientists’ 
work scientifically in order to explain 
their behaviour sociologically? This 
question specifies a fundamental 
methodological insight for science 
studies. If we need to acquire an “in-
terpretive understanding of social ac-
tion” in order to achieve “a causal ex-
planation of its course and conse-
quences” (Weber [1922] 1978: 4), than 
we routinely face the task of getting 
acquainted with the life-world under 
study – be it a youth subculture, a firm, 
a community, or a scientific field.  
While all sociological studies must 
accomplish an interpretive under-
standing of social action, the extent to 
which this is necessary and the difficul-
ties resulting from this task vary be-
tween fields of inquiry. We will argue 
that some studies of science depend on 
an understanding of science not only 
because it is important to understand 
frames of reference of respondents but 
also because we need to include the 
materiality of research actions in our 
explanatory models, and the research 
of our respondents provides the only 
access to these explanatory factors.  
Another property of our subject that 
makes understanding a difficult task is 
the way in which its practitioners have 
been prepared for their tasks. Being a 
competent member of the scientific 
culture requires an extended system-
atic prior training, a training the socio-
logical observer usually cannot un-
                                                             
                                                            
1  Along its way since its first presentation 
at the joint 4S/EASST conference in Vienna 
2000, this paper has benefited from critical 
comments by Martin Meister, Jörg 
Strübing, and Lucy Suchman, neither of 
whom will probably agree with the use we 
have made of what we have learned from 
them. We are also grateful to the reviewers 
of STI studies, whose critical comments led 
to another significant revision. 
dergo. This puts the observer at a dis-
advantage that cannot be overcome: 
Because exogenous learning is neces-
sary, sociological observers will not 
usually be able to perform the typical 
activities of the studied culture. Length 
of stay in the field can significantly 
reduce the gap between a member’s 
and an observer’s knowledge. How-
ever, the gap cannot be completely 
closed by staying in the culture.2 In 
this respect, the sciences are different 
from the many social settings that are 
‘self-explanatory’, i.e., which contain 
all knowledge that is needed to be a 
competent member (e.g. the communi-
ties of sports fans). People enter these 
social settings without any specific 
prior knowledge, and acquire all the 
knowledge a member of that setting is 
supposed to have by endogenous learn-
ing. Sociologists entering such a setting 
are in the same situation, which means 
that in principle they can acquire as 
much knowledge as any other prospec-
tive member of the culture.  
In this article, we address the general 
problem of understanding scientists 
and the ramifications for qualitative 
interviewing by answering three ques-
tions. Why should sociologists attempt 
to understand the science of their in-
terviewees? What happens prior to and 
during a scientifically informed inter-
view? What are the limitations of sci-
entifically informed interviewing? 
Except from some early reflections by 
Zuckerman, the problem of scientifi-
cally informed interviewing has not yet 
been discussed. When methodological 
problems of science studies are consid-
ered at all, the debate is almost exclu-
sively focused on problems of ethno-
graphic studies. In this debate, the 
problem of scientifically informed ob-
servation has been an important point. 
We therefore begin by identifying three 
approaches to the problem of ‘in-
formed observation’ in science studies 
 
2  The sciences share this property at least 
with the professions; see Ten Have’s (1995: 
254-256) distinction between “the lay 
world” and “the professional world”. 
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(2). Thereafter, we outline the position 
of general qualitative methodology, 
which is all in favour of informed in-
terviewing, and demonstrate why some 
research questions demand an en-
gagement with the content of our sub-
jects’ work that goes far beyond what is 
demanded by general methodology (3). 
Using our own experiences and mis-
takes, we then discuss the three main 
practical tasks that must be solved in 
scientifically informed interviewing of 
scientists (4). As a conclusion, we will 
discuss risks and limitations inherent 
to the strategy we propose (5). 
 
2 Methodologies of 
observation 
2.1 Naïve observation 
The first extensive ethnographic study 
of scientific practice was published by 
Latour and Woolgar ([1979] 1986). 
Latour and Woolgar took a surprising 
methodological position by stating 
explicitly that their ethnographic ob-
servation was conducted by applying 
the perspective of a “very naïve ob-
server” (Woolgar 1988: 83-96; Latour 
1990: 146; Latour and Woolgar [1979] 
1986: 12, 29-30). Latour characterised 
this methodological approach as devi-
ating from mainstream anthropology 
(the ‘source field’ of the ethnography of 
science), which has agreed upon the 
necessity to understand the content of 
actions under investigation (Latour 
1990: 146). He describes the “naïve” 
investigators’ perspective as that of an 
“... outside observer who does not know the 
language and the customs of the natives 
who are not supposed to read what he 
writes. As Woolgar has pointed out many 
times, […] this is a very naïve version of the 
naïve observer - a version that is now aban-
doned in mainstream ethnography and 
which seems to survive in so called ‘lab 
studies’.” (ibid.) 
Latour and Woolgar give good reasons 
for their methodological decision: 
We take the apparent superiority of the 
members of our laboratory in technical 
matters to be insignificant, in the sense 
that we do not regard prior cognition 
(or in the case of an ex-participant, 
prior socialisation) as a necessary pre-
requisite for understanding scientists’ 
work. This is similar to an anthropolo-
gist’s refusal to bow before the knowl-
edge of a primitive sorcerer. In our 
perspective, the dangers of “going na-
tive” outweigh the possible advantages 
of ease of access and rapid establish-
ment of rapport with participants. (La-
tour and Woolgar [1979] 1986: 29) 
Woolgar later reinforced this point by 
stating that there is a higher risk of 
‘going native’3 when observations of 
science are concerned:  
“The standard tension of any ethnographic 
study is present here. We want to see things 
from the natives’ point of view but we don’t 
want uncritically to adopt their belief sys-
tem. [..] Note, however, that in one impor-
tant sense it is more difficult to remain 
‘strange’ in the exotic culture we call sci-
ence than it is when conducting an ethnog-
raphy of, say, the Navaho Indians. When 
the latter informants tell us that they are 
dancing in order to make it rain, we can 
readily draw upon scepticism, which is ‘in-
built’ in virtue of our membership of ‘ad-
vanced Western culture’. But when infor-
mants amongst the tribe of scientists ex-
plain that the right-hand side of an equa-
tion ‘follows’ from the application of the 
rule of commutativity, we find it much 
more difficult to resist the apparent author-
ity of this explanation. Why? Simply be-
cause respect for scientific rationality is 
deeply embedded in our own (ethnogra-
phers’) culture.” (Woolgar 1988: 86) 
This is of course an important meth-
odological point: Everybody who is 
going to observe science has received a 
science education and a partial sociali-
sation as a scientist prior to the obser-
vation. It is therefore more difficult for 
an observer to stay the ‘stranger’ in a 
scientific environment than in others. 
Scientific practice is laden with reason-
ing and justifications, and “in the case 
                                                             
3  ‘Going native’ is one of the central 
methodological problems in anthropology. 
It describes the observer’s gradual adoption 
of the observed culture’s belief systems and 
perspectives, which leads to a loss of ana-
lytical distance and to the inability of ques-
tioning taken-for-granted positions and 
practices (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 
109-112).  
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of a scientific culture in particular, 
there is a strong tendency for the ob-
jects of that culture (facts) to provide 
their own explanation” (Latour and 
Woolgar [1979] 1986: 278). To reveal 
and to investigate taken-for-granted 
practices of scientific work can be as-
sumed to be more difficult, and the 
danger of ‘going native’ is higher.  
While the danger of ‘going native’ is 
real and the consequences would be 
severe, the methodological conclusion 
drawn by Latour and Woolgar has 
problematic consequences of its own 
(Lynch 1982: 506-509; Lynch 1993: 
93-102). Lynch raised two objections 
by pointing out (a) that Latour’s and 
Woolgar’s descriptions prove that they 
hadn’t been able to maintain their na-
ïve approach, and (b) that the naïve 
approach would severely limit the un-
derstanding of the object of observa-
tion. 
(a) Lynch observed that  
“… the account which resulted from their 
inquiry is far more comprehensive and 
detailed in its access to technical practices 
than could possibly have resulted from the 
‘observers’ initial man-from-Mars posture 
towards the work of lab members.” (ibid.: 
507) 
According to Lynch, a stranger’s “ac-
counts of what scientists do are con-
tinually and necessarily reflexive to the 
stranger’s understanding of those prac-
tices” (ibid.: 509). Interestingly enough, 
in Latour’s and Woolgar’s book the ob-
server’s understanding of scientific 
practices appears to vary significantly 
throughout the book. Chapter 2 takes 
the “vary naïve” perspective: 
Our anthropological observer is thus 
confronted with a strange tribe who 
spend the greatest part of their day 
coding, marking, altering, correcting, 
reading and writing. (Latour and 
Woolgar [1979] 1986: 49) 
Later in the same chapter, when the 
authors are describing the laboratory 
practice (ibid.: 53-69) and are catego-
rising scientific statements (ibid.: 69-
88), more background knowledge 
about the practices creeps in. Other-
wise, Latour and Woolgar could not 
have decided on what principles assays 
are based and what it means to repeat 
an assay (ibid.: 59-60); or what parts 
of a scientific statement are modalities, 
i.e. can be deleted without rendering 
the statement completely senseless 
(ibid.: 77-85). The story of the con-
struction of a fact - TRF(H) - in chap-
ter 3 could not have been told without 
reference to the scientific content of 
the respective activities. For example, 
statements such as “In total, four 
groups have worked on the isolation of 
TRF …” (ibid.: 114) are based on what 
“working on the isolation of TRF” 
means to the scientists in the observed 
field. In chapter 4, the observers draw 
a picture of scientists socially negotiat-
ing when constructing facts. In these 
discussions, the scientific content of 
scientists’ actions and accounts is sys-
tematically re-interpreted as being a 
resource in social negotiations. How-
ever, this is possible only because the 
analysts understand the significance of 
the scientific content of conversations 
and practices.  
(b) This purposeful ignorance of the 
content of the observed actions and the 
sole occupation with their outward 
appearance reduces the understanding 
of the observed practices to what is 
intelligible to the scientifically ignorant 
sociologist, as Lynch describes: 
“… Latour and Woolgar present their eth-
nography from the point of view of a fic-
tional “observer” who sees what is going on 
in the lab without being taken in by the 
scientists’ beliefs in an unseen biochemical 
order of things. The observer describes just 
what he finds intelligible in the lab: the 
traces, texts, conversational exchanges, 
ritualistic activities, and strange equip-
ment.” (Lynch 1993: 96) 
Not only is the observation reduced to 
what the naïve observer finds intelligi-
ble – the observers also can record 
their observation only in their own 
language. Thus, the naïve observers 
were forced from the beginning to se-
lect events and actions that seemed 
intelligible to them and to record them 
in a sociological language and attached 
conceptual frameworks. Influential 
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concepts such as “inscription devices” 
appear to be the result of that naïve 
approach (Latour and Woolgar 1986 
[1979]: 51-53).  
We agree with both points made by 
Lynch. The perspective of a “naïve ob-
server” is not only difficult to maintain 
but also methodologically problematic. 
While some general concepts such as 
‘inscription device’ (or possibly even 
the whole Actor-Network Theory) may 
be a consequence of a naïve observa-
tion, the explanation of the “micro-
processing of facts” is obviously not. 
Another indicator of the limitations of 
“naïve observation” is that this ap-
proach has not been applied by other 
ethnographers of science.4 
2.2 Informed observation 
With “informed observation” we refer 
to social studies of science undertaken 
by sociologists who acquire a scientific 
understanding of the field they study 
by self-education prior to or at the be-
ginning of their empirical study. The 
necessity of understanding scientists’ 
work scientifically has been first dis-
cussed by Zuckerman in her methodo-
logical reflections on interviewing No-
bel laureates (Zuckerman 1972, see 
3.1). After the sociology of scientific 
knowledge has become the mainstream 
of the sociology of science, the problem 
has been repeatedly addressed in the 
context of ethnographic studies of sci-
entific practice. With the exception of 
Latour and Woolgar, all ethnographers 
of science have taken the position that 
an informed observation of this kind is 
necessary.5 Collins and Pinch con-
                                                             
                                                            
4  Interestingly, Latour used a review of 
Lynch’s (1985) book, which is based on 
informed observation, to state: “that one 
should become familiar with the practices 
of the people one wishes to study (…) is the 
basic tenet of all ethnographic work, and it 
is hard to dispute.” (Latour 1986: 544).  
5  This was also Woolgar’s position before 
he turned to laboratory studies. In an arti-
cle on the discovery of pulsar phenomena, 
he wrote: “In research of this kind, I obvi-
ously needed to be aware of the scientific 
issues in order to correspond with or inter-
view participants.” (Woolgar 1976: 396).  
ducted their participant observation of 
research on ‘spoonbending’ as an in-
formed observation (Collins and Pinch 
1982; for a methodological discussion 
see Collins 1984). They took part in an 
investigation of paranormal phenom-
ena by taking the role of researchers. 
Therefore, they had to acquire “native 
competence” (ibid.: 54). In one of his 
articles on his studies of the search for 
gravitational waves, Collins explicates 
his methodological position: 
“The more narrow methodological stance 
adopted in this article is ‘participant com-
prehension’ (…) Participant comprehension 
is an interpretation of participant observa-
tion under which the field-worker tries to 
acquire as high a degree of native compe-
tence as possible and interaction is maxi-
mized without worrying about disturbing 
the field site; this ideal should always direct 
the research effort, even though the degree 
of native competence attained will vary 
from study to study.” (Collins 1998: 297) 
Collins further states that while he has 
not “achieved anything like full native 
competence in gravitational radiation 
research”, he believes that he has 
gained “enough understanding to be 
able to carry out the kind of sociologi-
cal analysis presented here” (ibid.: 
298). He bases this judgement on 
comparisons to parapsychology (where 
he became a “full-blown expert”) and 
to the theory of amorphous semicon-
ductors, which he had to abandon be-
cause he could not understand any of 
the science. (ibid., note 6). 
The same approach can be assigned to 
Lynch (1982; 1985; 1993; 1994), who 
bases it on ethnomethodology’s princi-
ple of “unique adequacy” which re-
quires ethnomethodologists gain the 
capability to perform the characteristic 
practices in the field under study 
(Garfinkel and Wieder 1992: 182-184; 
Lynch 1993: 271-275).6 When these 
 
6  Lynch links his methodology to the 
work of Winch (1958; 1974). Hirschauer 
(1994: 338-345) traces the principle of 
informed observation back to Malinowski 
([1922] 1972) and Schütz (1962). The ne-
cessity of informed observation was also 
stated explicitly by Knorr-Cetina in an arti-
cle on anthropology and ethnomethodology 
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capabilities could not be developed by 
simply staying in the field long enough, 
some of the ethnomethodologists took 
the relevant formal training (Lynch 
1993: 274). Lynch himself did not un-
dergo the formal training. Instead, he 
was given “a rather informal course of 
training in the substantive and meth-
odological features of the lab’s re-
search” (Lynch 1985: 1-2). After his 
training, he was still  
“… unable to participate in the lab’s re-
searches, though I achieved a competence 
in some of the analytic skills used in as-
sembling and interpreting electron micro-
scopic displays of brain tissues. These lim-
ited competences gave me considerably 
more access to the talk and conduct which I 
witnessed in the lab than would have been 
possible had I relied solely on the analytic 
skills of a social scientist while observing 
members activities.” (Lynch 1985: 2) 
The practical difficulties of informed 
observation are rarely addressed. 
Collins reports that he had to abandon 
one case study because he was not able 
to acquire enough competence (see 
above). Lynch mentions his “limited 
competence” but comments that it is 
impossible to tell what is missing be-
cause of these limitations (Lynch 1982: 
529). Thus, both authors confirm the 
principal limitation of informed obser-
vation – the sociological observer can 
achieve some understanding of the 
science that is being observed, but 
cannot become competent enough to 
perform the research they observe. The 
consequences of these limitations for 
science studies are not discussed. 
2.3 Native observation 
One special way of conducting in-
formed observations is ‘native observa-
tion’, i.e. an observation conducted by 
scientists from the field who have 
turned into sociologists. Examples of 
this biographical turn are the radio 
astronomer Edge (Mulkay and Edge 
1976), the physicists Pickering 
                                                                         
                                                            
(Knorr-Cetina [1980] 1993: 170) and ap-
plied by her in her ethnographic studies 
(Knorr-Cetina 1981: 31, note 64). Another 
ethnographer who chose informed observa-
tion is Traweek (1988: 9-11).  
(Pickering 1984, 1995), Pinch (1986)7 
and Merz (Merz and Knorr-Cetina 
1997; Merz 1999), the immunologist 
Löwy (1997), and the biologist Cam-
brosio (Cambrosio and Keating 1988, 
1995). All these observers studied sci-
entists of their own research field or at 
least of their broader research disci-
pline. Cambrosio even attended a spe-
cial scientific training session on the 
subject he and his colleague were 
studying (Cambrosio and Keating 
1988: 249).  
We think that the strategy of ‘native 
observation’ deserves a special discus-
sion. Being ‘a native of the tribe’ is an 
important asset for an informed obser-
vation. Only native observers are able 
to close the gap between the observer’s 
and the subjects’ knowledge. As Knorr-
Cetina and Merz argued in a comment, 
native observation enables a deeper 
understanding of scientific practice. 
They argued that “thin descriptions of 
the material dynamics and performa-
tive orderings of behavioural domains” 
are of interest to science studies 
(Knorr-Cetina and Merz 1997: 129-
130). Given the limitations of informed 
observation, native observation ap-
pears to be the only way to arrive at 
this kind of account of scientific prac-
tice. Mulkay even went as far as stating 
“if we are to study in detail the opera-
tion of scientific communities, we must 
have the active cooperation of partici-
pants or ex-participants” (Mulkay 
1976: 210-211).  
While native observation solves the 
problem of understanding the field 
under study, it is not without prob-
lems. The observed or interviewed sci-
entists are likely to relate differently to 
a former colleague who has turned into 
 
7  Pinch notes the requirement that the 
sociologist has “to familiarize himself or 
herself with the technical issues which are 
at the core of the scientific ‘life world’” and 
states that his “own background in physics 
has proved invaluable in this task” (Pinch 
1986: 197). He even included a section on 
“Some Technical Details of Solar-Neutrino-
Detection” in his book (ibid.: 41-48). 
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a sociological observer. This was first 
observed by Mulkay and Edge: 
A second possible source of bias arises 
from the fact that one of us was origi-
nally trained as a radio astronomer. In 
many ways this was, of course, an im-
mense advantage. It enabled us, for 
instance, to explore in detail the scien-
tific and technical literature, and it 
made possible an exceptional degree of 
cooperation between researchers and 
respondents. On the other hand, it 
meant that one of the interviewers was 
regarded by respondents, on some 
issues at least, as another participant. 
It was, therefore, impossible for the 
interviewer to avoid being drawn 
sometimes into a dialogue with his 
subjects, during which he was expected 
to act, not as an impartial outsider, but 
as an involved colleague. As far as we 
can judge, however, respondents did 
not hesitate to disagree with the inter-
viewer in these exchanges of judge-
ments and opinions. (Mulkay and Edge 
1976: 3-4) 
An emerging role ambiguity of the ob-
server/interviewer was also observed 
by Löwy who commented that some of 
the scientists she observed regarded 
her as an ex-colleague with an unclear 
professional identity. Her observation 
was sometimes assessed as “secret 
longing to return to the laboratory”. 
Some scientists “were not sure how to 
classify a fellow researcher who shared 
with them expert knowledge and fa-
miliarity with the laboratory culture, 
but professed radically different goals”. 
She herself felt as a “’native of no-
where’ – an inadequate immunologist 
and an awkward historian”. (Löwy 
1997: 93) She concludes:  
‘Going’ native is perhaps helpful in 
studying modern science, but investi-
gators who observe scientists’ activities 
still need to decide how ‘native’ should 
one go, and for how long. (ibid.) 
Unfortunately, the authors who no-
ticed particular relationships between 
scientist-observers and respondents 
did not discuss the possible impact of 
these relationships on their study. We 
are therefore unable to tell how the 
described problems influenced the 
social accounts of the scientific prac-
tices they studied.  
Another problem is the greater danger 
of ‘going native’. In the study on radio 
astronomy, Mulkay observed that there 
is a danger that native observation 
“may lead to the investigators’ taking 
over false, or incomplete, assumptions 
from the group under study” (Mulkay 
1976: 211). In the case of another na-
tive observation, the observers were 
directly accused that their “going na-
tive” had compromised the study. To 
conduct a native observation was also a 
deliberate decision in an ethnographic 
analysis of theoretical physics (Knorr-
Cetina and Merz 1997: 125; Merz and 
Knorr-Cetina 1997: 74). It was criti-
cised by Gale and Pinnick (1997). Gale 
and Pinnick accused Merz and Knorr-
Cetina of introducing a third, “explana-
tory” language (additionally to the par-
ticipants’ and the observer’s language) 
that was so close to the participants’ 
language that it imports the partici-
pants’ metaphysical realism in their 
explanation. By using this third lan-
guage, Merz and Knorr-Cetina adopt 
the perspectives (especially the phi-
losophical perspectives) of their par-
ticipants – a specific case of ‘going na-
tive’ (Gale and Pinnick 1997: 117-121). 
Knorr-Cetina and Merz rejected the 
critique by pointing out that Gale and 
Pinnick criticise their methodology 
without criticising the results obtained 
by applying this methodology (Knorr-
Cetina and Merz 1997: 126). Indeed, 
Gale and Pinnick mentioned only one 
negative consequence of the approach 
chosen by Merz and Knorr-Cetina – 
the adaptation of physicists’ meta-
physical realism. But not even this cri-
tique is justifiable. Rather than invok-
ing metaphysical realism, the reference 
to mathematical structures’ “hardness” 
by Knorr-Cetina and Merz is nothing 
but the application of a well-known 
sociological insight that applies to 
mathematical objects as well: “The 
paradox is that man is capable of pro-
ducing a world that he then experi-
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ences as something other than a hu-
man product.” (Berger and Luckmann 
1967: 57). As is the case with the par-
ticular relationships discussed above, 
the risk of ‘going native’ has been ac-
knowledged but not discussed with 
regard to possible changes in the re-
sults of the studies. While native ob-
servation certainly bears the risk of 
‘going native’, it has not yet been 
proven that this actually occurred, and 
the consequences for the empirical 
studies are unknown. 
 
3 Informed interviewing in 
science studies 
3.1 Informed interviewing as a 
principle of general qualita-
tive methodology 
While the argument for ‘naive observa-
tion’ of scientific practice has admit-
tedly been made against the methodo-
logical mainstream of ethnography, no 
such stance has been taken with regard 
to qualitative interviews.8 The general 
methodological tenet – that prepara-
tion of interviews and informed inter-
viewing are prerequisites for success – 
has remained unchallenged in science 
studies. 
The central argument for informed 
interviewing is based on the under-
standing of the interview situation as a 
communication process in which the 
two partners jointly construct the 
meanings of both, questions and an-
swers (Cicourel 1964: 96-100; Briggs 
1986; Holstein and Gubrium 1995: 45-
46). In order to solicit the specific and 
                                                             
                                                            
8 The extent to which ‘informed interview-
ing’ is necessary at all depends on the re-
search question and on the kind of qualita-
tive interview that is used in research. In 
this article, we focus on semi-structured 
interviews, i.e. on interviews based on an 
interview guide, which are used to obtain 
information about the impact of specific 
conditions on respondents’ work processes 
(see 3.2). Other kinds of interviews (e.g. 
narrative interviews conducted with the 
aim to explore how respondents construct 
their life-stories) may not require or enable 
informed interviewing.  
detailed information they need, re-
searchers must translate their interests 
into the contexts of their interviewee. 
Otherwise, neither formulating appro-
priate questions nor understanding the 
interviewee is possible (Merton, Fiske, 
and Kendall 1956; Hopf 1978: 99-101).9 
As Briggs’ discussion of “communica-
tive blunders” in interviews proves, the 
failure to understand the respondents’ 
social world may result in asking the 
wrong questions, receiving answers to 
questions not asked, or simply not 
comprehending the right answers to 
questions (Briggs 1986: 39-60).  
Thus, general methodology of qualita-
tive interviewing unanimously consid-
ers informed interviewing as essential 
for the crucial task of understanding. 
Briggs demonstrates that even in the 
interviews he conducted as part of his 
ethnographic observation, his lack of 
understanding of the social context 
and worldviews of his respondents was 
a source of errors, of the inability to 
ask properly and to understand the 
answers. He was able to overcome 
these problems because his stay in the 
field made it possible to learn enough 
about the frames of reference of his 
informants. As we have noted in our 
discussion of naïve observation, even 
the deliberately naïve approach of La-
tour and Woolgar yielded to learning, 
which led to a better understanding of 
frames of reference and meanings of 
the field.  
A second argument for informed inter-
viewing refers to the social relationship 
between interviewer and respondent. 
Being informed helps to demonstrate 
competence, and thus to be taken seri-
ously. As Rubin and Rubin put it: 
Your informed questions signal the 
interviewees that you have done your 
homework, made an effort, and have 
not just come to pick their brain. You 
have gone as far as you can go with the 
 
9 Zuckerman (1972: 165) confirmed that 
her preparation of interviews with Nobel 
laureates often called forth responses that 
otherwise would not have been elicited. 
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available material and now you need 
some help. (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 
198) 
This advice is in accordance with the 
experience of Zuckerman, who inter-
viewed Nobel laureates. She describes 
the functions of her preparations as 
“giving evidence of the seriousness of 
the interviewer” and “legitimise ex-
penditure of time on the interview”: 
Almost all the Nobelists are acutely 
concerned with maximizing the use of 
that inevitably scarce resource, time 
(…) In part, their commitment to the 
intellectually profitable use of their 
time led them to subject the inter-
viewer to an almost continuous series 
of tests to ascertain the degree of her 
competence and commitment. (Zuck-
erman 1972: 165) 
Sometimes the Laureates perceived her 
as a “combination layman-expert” in 
their research fields (ibid.: 173). Zuck-
erman quoted one interviewee who 
told her 
“I said to myself before you came, ‘If she 
wants to ask me about social things, I will 
get her out of here fast.’ But you asked me 
about important things. What is written 
about science is never quite right. You have 
to hear it from the people who were there.” 
(ibid.: 165) 
3.2 Scientifically informed inter-
viewing for collecting scien-
tific data 
When we apply the general methodo-
logical principles to qualitative inter-
views with scientists, we inevitably 
arrive at the conclusion that we need to 
learn their science in order to under-
stand them. This holds true for all re-
search in science studies that uses sci-
entists as informants. In particular, it 
applies to qualitative interviews both 
as a ‘stand alone’-method and as inter-
views with key informants as part of an 
ethnographic study.  
In some areas of science studies, the 
necessity of scientifically informed 
interviewing follows not only from 
general methodology but also from the 
theoretical intentions of the research. 
Whenever the content of the science 
under investigation forms part of the 
aimed-for sociological explanation, it is 
not sufficient to understand our re-
spondents’ research as a relevant social 
context and frame of reference. We 
must systematically investigate the 
content of our respondents’ research in 
order to obtain information about 
knowledge, technology and nature, 
which ultimately informs our socio-
logical explanations. Empirical re-
search of this kind requires to under-
stand the problems, strategies, and 
logic of scientific research, and to in-
clude non-social factors in our expla-
nations. We can leave aside here the 
differences between the concepts of 
‘non-human actants’ (e.g. Callon 1986; 
Latour 1988; Law and Callon 1988), 
the ‘mangle of practice’ (Pickering 
1995), and ‘thin description’ (Knorr-
Cetina and Merz 1997, see 2.3) and 
focus on the point they have in com-
mon: Understanding and explaining 
scientific practice requires the inclu-
sion of the non-social phenomena sci-
entists deal with (Gläser and Laudel 
2004).10 
We can illustrate this point by using 
our own research as an example. We 
are interested in how institutional 
conditions of action (as provided by 
funding programs, science policy, law, 
formal organisations, informal rules 
within scientific communities etc.) 
affect the production of scientific 
knowledge. For example, we ask how 
institutional conditions of actions af-
fect interdisciplinary collaboration 
(Laudel 1999, 2001), how the institu-
tional change that accompanied Ger-
man unification affected links between 
basic research and applications (Gläser 
1998, 2000), or how evaluation-based 
funding of university research affects 
                                                             
10 This problem is not unique to science 
studies but has been acknowledged and 
explicitly discussed here. One of the solu-
tions to the problem of integrating social 
and non-social factors in explanations – 
Actor-Network-Theory (e.g. Callon 1986; 
Latour 1988; Law and Callon 1988)– has 
become influential beyond science studies. 
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the content of this research (Gläser 
and Laudel 2007). We are interested in 
how these factors affect the content of 
scientific knowledge that is produced. 
This research interest differs from the 
Mertonian sociology of science in that 
it regards the content and forms of 
practices and knowledge as explanan-
dum.11 It differs from the sociology of 
scientific knowledge in the explicit 
regard of social macrostructures, 
namely institutions, as part of the ex-
planans.12  
Following ideas of the new institution-
alism that have emerged in political 
sociology, organisational sociology and 
economics, we regard institutions as 
only one of several factors that shape 
social action. In science studies institu-
tional effects are likely to be field-
specific, because the influence of insti-
tutions is modified by the epistemic 
practices that are characteristic of spe-
cific areas of inquiry. Thus, epistemic 
conditions of action and epistemic 
practices must be included in institu-
tionalist analyses as intervening fac-
tors. We must conduct comparative 
studies across scientific fields and as-
sess the mediation and modification of 
institutional influences by field-specific 
epistemic conditions of action and 
epistemic practices (Gläser and Laudel 
2004).  
An empirical example for this kind of 
research is an investigation of institu-
tional conditions for interdisciplinary 
collaboration (Laudel 1999, 2001). In 
order to find causal relationships be-
tween the institutional conditions of 
action and results of collaborative 
work, all factors that promoted, hin-
dered, enabled or prevented a collabo-
rative project’s success must be ana-
lysed. When a scientist answered: “the 
collaboration didn't work”, it had to be 
clarified what “it didn't work” actually 
                                                             
11 For comments on this ‘blind spot’ of Mer-
tonian sociology of science, see e.g. Whitley 
(1972). 
12 For comments on this ‘blind spot’ of 
laboratory studies, see e.g. Knorr-Cetina 
(1995: 162) and Kleinman (1998: 288-289). 
meant i.e. to what kinds of causes the 
scientist referred. In one case, the fur-
ther probing solicited the following 
explanation:  
 The (…) protein (…) he [the biochemist] 
gave us, (…) was always too contami-
nated (…) it has never worked. (…) If 
you want to crystallize it, it must be per-
fectly pure, otherwise it doesn’t work. 
Some proteins are very difficult to pu-
rify (…).  
The scientist referred to a ‘material 
resistance’ (the protein’s insufficient 
purity) as the main cause for the col-
laboration’s failure. This was con-
firmed by other interviews and docu-
ments. It became clear that neither 
institutional conditions or actions, nor 
lack of resources, nor difficult personal 
relations (the partners collaborated 
successfully in other projects and got 
along well) nor other social reasons 
could explain the collaboration’s fail-
ure. Epistemic conditions of action 
(the difficulties of protein purification 
and the high purity that is required by 
crystallization methods) had to be in-
cluded in this explanation. More gen-
erally, epistemic conditions of action 
had to be included in the investigation 
in order to provide accounts for the 
success or failure of collaborations that 
took place under similar institutional 
conditions. In order to do that, we had 
to address the content of research in 
our interviews, and had to ask about it 
in the interviewee’s language and 
frame of reference. We had to under-
stand that it is necessary to crystallize 
a protein in order to analyse its struc-
ture, that the protein had to be “per-
fectly pure” for crystallization to work 
(and what “perfectly pure” meant in 
this context), and that purifying pro-
teins is not an equally straightforward 
procedure for all proteins. 
Our point is that studies of institu-
tional influences on the content of re-
search, and probably many other areas 
of science studies, need scientifically 
informed interviewing not only to 
properly construct meaning and un-
derstanding of social factors a study is 
interested in but also of factors that are 
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alien to social studies of science, and 
are commonly described in the scien-
tific languages of the respondents’ 
fields. In these studies, we need to sci-
entifically prepare interviews not only 
to achieve the kind of communication 
between interviewer and respondent 
that is deemed necessary by general 
qualitative methodology. We also need 
to gather information on non-social 
factors that need to be included in our 
explanations. The source of this infor-
mation is our respondent, and the only 
frame of reference in which they can 
provide this information is their sci-
ence. 
 
4 Informed interviewing: 
Three tasks 
4.1 Creating an ‘ad hoc- pidgin’ 
One important aspect of any qualita-
tive interview is that it must be con-
ducted in a language that enables the 
investigator to obtain relevant infor-
mation. Consequently, the language 
must be understandable to both the 
interviewer and the interviewee, and 
must facilitate the description of the 
interviewee’s world. If the world is 
sufficiently remote from the everyday 
world that can be assumed to be 
shared by interviewer and interviewee, 
the emerging language can be regarded 
as an ‘ad-hoc – pidgin’. We borrow the 
term pidgin from Galison who used the 
metaphor of pidgins and creoles to 
explain the stabilisation of interdisci-
plinary collaborations (Galison 1996). 
It seems useful because a sociological 
interview of scientists is very similar to 
an interdisciplinary collaboration. The 
interactionist perspective on interview-
ing maintains that interviewer and 
respondent collaborate with the aim of 
producing information needed by the 
interviewer. In this ad hoc-
collaboration, two worlds – the world 
of sociological investigation and the 
world of the scientist’s work – inter-
sect, and in order to communicate 
about it, a common language must be 
constructed. In this process, the task of 
the interviewer is not merely to adjust 
their language to the different cultural 
background of the respondent, but to 
create a language in which the relevant 
work experiences can be described in a 
way that is intelligible to both sides. In 
this process, the interviewer must 
adopt elements of the respondent’s 
language and vice versa. 
The interviewer is suggesting such a 
language by using concepts from the 
scientist’s world (which she obtained 
during her preparation, see 4.2) and 
simplifying the relationships between 
them. The main difference between the 
original meaning of the concept 
‘pidgin’ in Galison’s account and the 
situation in an interview is that despite 
all of the interviewer’s preparations, 
the language must be created almost 
instantaneously, namely in the course 
of one interview.  
The strategies for creating such a 
pidgin depend on the subject matter 
the sociologist is interested in as well 
as on the way this subject matter is 
experienced by the scientist in his or 
her everyday practice. In our inter-
views, we repeatedly observed that 
scientists switch between more techni-
cal and more social descriptions. When 
asked about their research processes, 
scientists described them in a pre-
dominantly technical way by referring 
to the epistemic content of their work 
– research problems, objects and 
methods of experimentation, instru-
ments etc. For example, scientists pre-
sent the system of experimental opera-
tions (synthesizing substances, meas-
uring etc.) when describing collabora-
tions. They told us that they used cer-
tain research methods, special sub-
stances etc. and therefore collaborated 
with scientists from other research 
groups who could provide them. Social 
relations and interactions that enabled, 
performed and accompanied this sys-
tem of operations appear to be more in 
the background of the interviewees’ 
reconstructions. Conversely, scientists 
describe their research fields as a con-
stellation of actors (mainly research 
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groups) and don’t seem to perceive it 
as an evolving body of knowledge.  
On the basis of this tentative conclu-
sion from our interviews, we developed 
different strategies for obtaining in-
formation about the interviewee’s ‘lo-
cal’ work and about her community, 
respectively. When interested in single 
research processes, we suggest a more 
technical pidgin, i.e. we try to use a 
more technical language in order to 
investigate both epistemic and social 
aspects of the situation. In explora-
tions of characteristics of scientific 
fields, we apply a more social pidgin 
and use it to obtain information about 
both types of characteristics. 
a) Communication about the inter-
viewee’s ‘local’ work 
For the exploration of a scientist’s re-
search projects we use a pidgin that is 
predominantly technical. As a skeleton 
of such a language, some concepts de-
scribing general elements of research 
processes can be used. In any empirical 
research process researchers start with 
a question that is somehow rooted in a 
theoretical background, investigate a 
research object by applying methods 
that must be developed or adapted, 
and interpret the empirical results. 
Although there will be only a few re-
search projects that follow exactly that 
sequence of steps, the steps themselves 
will occur in one form or another in all 
research processes, and scientists’ per-
ceptions of research processes corre-
spond to this model.  
We can use this very abstract level of 
common experiences to formulate 
questions about the interviewee’s re-
search. In the investigation of scien-
tists' collaborations interviewees were 
asked about the elements of their re-
search processes, e.g. by using the fol-
lowing questions:  
• What research problem do you deal 
with? 
• Could you explain to an outsider 
what it is you try to find out? 
• What methods do you apply? What 
equipment do you use? 
• What substances do you use? 
Where do these substances come 
from? 
Wherever possible, these questions 
were specified by detailed knowledge 
that had been acquired in the prepara-
tion of the interview by reading re-
search proposals, research reports etc. 
(see 4.2). The questions about ele-
ments of research processes led to 
hints about other researchers who con-
tributed to the interviewees’ research 
in different phases. Thus, the cognitive 
links that were created via the ex-
change of substances, joint use of 
equipment etc. hinted to other re-
searchers who were identified as col-
laborators. 
Q: The first thing is already this tricky 
question about understanding what you 
are trying to find out; what your current 
research is about. I had a look at your 
website and there was mentioning that 
you basically use this low energy elec-
tron microscope (…) to study the dy-
namics of processes on surfaces of 
semiconductors.  
A: Yes, particularly the III-V systems.  
Q: Yes. So, that would establish your object 
and the method, but what’s the problem 
you are trying to solve? 
A: Yes, well there are really two aspects to 
what we’re trying to do. One is to look 
at III-V semi-conductors - so the idea is 
to really understand how atoms move 
around on the surfaces, the very basic 
statistical mechanics, thermodynamics 
of self organizations, how objects such 
as quantum dots form and that’s a very 
big controversial area at the moment 
(…)  
In this part of the interview, the inter-
viewer and the interviewee jointly de-
constructed the interviewee’s research 
project, which led to the identification 
of collaborations. The basis of this de-
construction was that both partners 
knew that a variety of method could be 
used to achieve the aim of the project 
and that the equipment of the inter-
viewee’s lab limited the range of meth-
ods that could be used locally. The de-
construction strategy worked well in all 
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interviews on collaboration. By ‘disas-
sembling’ the research process into its 
elements it was possible to find oppor-
tunities for collaboration, as well as 
real (successful and unsuccessful) col-
laborations. The variation of links be-
tween the research processes that were 
reported in the interviews supported 
the construction of types of collabora-
tions. 
A similar strategy was applied in an 
investigation of East German basic 
research. The aim of the project was to 
find out whether the radical institu-
tional changes that accompanied Ger-
man unification led to changes of the 
basic/applied character of East Ger-
man research (Gläser 1998, 2000). In 
this project, an in-depth description of 
the basic/applied character and its 
dynamics was needed. As was the case 
with collaborations, the elements re-
search problem, research methods and 
research objects were used to ask de-
tailed questions about actual and pos-
sible links of interviewees’ projects to 
contexts of application.  
Q: If I understand it correctly, your work is 
purely theoretical. 
A: This is a theoretical research group, 
basic research, but we have always 
worked close to the experiments and do 
it now more intensively because we 
benefit from new opportunities to col-
laborate with the right groups. 
Q: That would have been my next point: It 
is possible in the field of theory to work 
far remote from experimental systems, 
which means to work with models that 
are so abstract that they do not corre-
spond to experimental systems. Does 
this happen in your group? 
A:  We don't do this. Actually, the work 
with the polymers might be slightly 
more Hamiltonian-oriented, but not in 
our group. We have very, very close 
connections to experimental groups. 
Q: Work on semiconductors and connec-
tions with experimental groups suggest 
that there is a link to applications? 
A:  Yes, this link surely exists in the end. 
Depending on how the funding agency 
regards its importance, one can empha-
sise it more or less. I wouldn't regard it 
primary for me and my work. It is actu-
ally the explorative side of basic re-
search. It is not excluded that there is 
an application in the end, but that is not 
our primary concern. 
Q: Would these applications emerge from 
your research, or would they be a result 
of experimental research? 
A:  This would be a result of the experi-
menters' work. 
Constructing this conversation re-
quired knowledge about the two kinds 
of theoretical practice in physics – in-
vestigating theories that have no links 
to experimental research at all and 
theoretical interpretation (modelling) 
of experimental data - and about pos-
sible links between theoretical physics 
and applications – the object that is 
modelled (semiconductors) and the 
experimental research groups whose 
data form an input for theoretical re-
search. The interviewers’ success de-
pended primarily on the common lan-
guage that was constructed at an ap-
propriate level of simplification. This 
was particularly problematic in the 
investigation of theoretical research 
processes that cannot be talked about 
in terms of comprehensible manual 
operations. Extensive mathematical 
knowledge might be necessary even to 
understand the elements of the re-
search process. Therefore, in some 
interviews with theoretical physicists 
we had to rely on global descriptions 
because we didn’t comprehend the 
mathematics well enough.  
b) Communication about the inter-
viewee’s research field 
To achieve an ‘ad-hoc pidgin’ for the 
communication about research fields is 
more difficult. Attributes of research 
fields are aggregations of research 
processes or emergent characteristics 
at the field level. A big problem that 
hinders all communications about re-
search fields is the latter’s fuzzy and 
fractal structure. The simple question 
“To which research field does your 
work belong?” already leads to difficul-
ties because the interviewee can sub-
sume his or her research under a 
broader or narrower research field at 
will. The term ‘field’ is subject to 
widely varying interpretations, as was 
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described for ‘collaboration’ and ‘ba-
sic/applied character’ (see 3.3). The 
interviewees name their field close to 
the level of a discipline (for instance, 
“Organic Chemistry”), or as a subfield, 
or even by describing the subject mat-
ter of their current research. Therefore 
it is very difficult to agree on the con-
versation’s subject matter in these 
parts of an interview.  
A second problem is that characteris-
tics of a field that are needed in science 
studies - size, age, growth dynamics, 
internal structure (how many subfields 
and their degree of connectedness) etc. 
– are not part of scientists’ everyday 
experience.13 Scientists, of course, do 
understand the terms “size of a field” 
or “dynamics of the field”. However, 
questions about these characteristics 
force them to look from above on their 
own field and even to compare it with 
other fields to which they do not be-
long. Thus, a badly operationalised 
question could lead to answers that 
were hardly interpretable, or even to a 
blunt rejection. 
Q: How would you – to provide me with a 
picture – describe the field ‘integrated 
optics’? How big is it approximately? 
A:  How big it is I can’t answer because I 
don’t know what the scale is. 
The characteristics of fields that soci-
ology of science is interested in are not 
established with an absolute scale but 
only in a comparative perspective. 
Younger scientists often have difficul-
ties comparing their own field with 
others. In our interviews, only senior 
scientists who are core members of one 
scientific community and are familiar 
with others were able to give compara-
tive descriptions of their fields, and 
even they had sometimes difficulties. 
                                                             
13 This does not mean that research fields 
are not an important environment for sci-
entists, as was claimed by Knorr-Cetina 
(1982) and Luukkonen (1995: 364). In our 
interviews, fields were always an important 
frame of reference for scientists even 
though our respondents constructed them 
in varying and often idiosyncratic ways, 
which complicated the task of soliciting 
comparable descriptions. 
Moreover, their descriptions are 
shaped by the fields they select as ref-
erences.  
For these reasons, we translate the 
cognitive characteristics of research 
fields into social indicators, thus creat-
ing a pidgin that is primarily social and 
thus closer to the scientists’ experi-
ences of social interactions with other 
members of their field. For example, 
the following questions were used to 
obtain information about a field's size:  
• How many scientists do you know 
who work in your field?  
• Is there sharp competition in your 
field?  
• Does your field have its own confer-
ences? How many people usually 
attend these conferences?  
• Does your field have its own jour-
nals?  
• Which groups work in your coun-
try/world-wide in your field?  
In the following example, the inter-
viewee was able to answer the question 
and additionally introduced a compari-
son with another field whose confer-
ences he has attended.  
Q: When you attend conferences: How 
many polymer physicists are there? I 
am trying to learn something about the 
size. 
A: This can be answered relatively pre-
cisely: In the German Physics Society a 
Committee ‘Polymer Physics’ exists 
which usually brings together 250 to 
300 people. That is a small group. If 
you compare it with others, solid state 
physics are 1000 or even more. We 
can’t match this. 
The interviewee could easily answer 
the question because it was related to 
his personal experience. He was not 
forced to interpret an abstract concept 
he never or rarely applies to his field 
(size), but was asked for empirical in-
formation he had no problems provid-
ing. 
4.2 Preparing the interview 
Conducting a scientifically informed 
interview requires extensive prepara-
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tion. We must not only develop our 
own conceptual schemes and translate 
them into interview questions but also 
(at least to some degree) the concep-
tual schemes and research strategies of 
our respondents. Unfortunately, inter-
viewing as a ‘stand alone’ strategy of 
data collection does not enable learn-
ing processes in the field. The inter-
viewer has only one opportunity – the 
one to two hours of interaction in the 
actual interview - ‘to get it right’. 
Therefore, in qualitative interviewing 
the learning must take place prior to 
data collection. This is particularly 
demanding when a study features a 
comparative approach that includes 
several fields, thus requiring the un-
derstanding of not one scientific cul-
ture (as usually is the case in ethno-
graphic studies), but several of them 
simultaneously. We have faced this 
problem in our own comparative stud-
ies of institutional influences on the 
production of scientific knowledge. 
The comparative approach severely 
limits the time one can spend for un-
derstanding the fields.  
We usually apply three strategies of 
information collection. Firstly, we try 
to obtain general information about 
the research field(s) under investiga-
tion by studying reference books of the 
discipline the field belongs to or of the 
field itself. We used these books espe-
cially to get information about the 
field’s most important methods and to 
understand basic, often used terms. Of 
course, it is impossible to catch up with 
years of scientific training by studying 
reference books. But it was possible in 
almost all cases of experimental re-
search to develop a general under-
standing of what the work in the field 
is about and how problems are tackled. 
The following quotation exemplifies 
why it is useful to get this kind of 
knowledge:  
Q: What is the common background of the 
projects you are conducting? 
A:  Organic Chemistry. 
Q: This is very general. Organic chemistry 
is a very large field. 
A: Synthesis and Preparation of natural 
substances and synthesis of derivatives. 
That could be said, generally. 
Since the interviewer knew that or-
ganic chemistry is too large to form the 
common background of a single scien-
tist's projects she was able to extract a 
specification. The strategy of studying 
reference books becomes rather diffi-
cult or even impossible if a whole 
range of research fields has to be inves-
tigated. However, we would still pro-
pose to try. 
The second strategy is essential for 
informed interviewing and should al-
ways be applied. It is crucial to collect 
information about the interviewee’s 
research prior to the interview. Zuck-
erman (1972: 163-166) reported how 
extensively she prepared her inter-
views with Nobel laureates. She stud-
ied the laureates’ addresses given on 
the occasion of their Prizes, prepared 
publication lists, and read publications 
like those written by the laureates for 
lay audiences. She prepared a sum-
mary of each laureate’s career and his 
work as a preparation for the inter-
view.  
We usually prepare our interviews in a 
similar way. As a rule we use the fol-
lowing sources to get information 
about the scientists work: 
• Research proposals and research 
reports;  
• Publication lists from publication 
databases like the Science Citation 
Index; and increasingly in the last 
years 
• Information obtained from the 
internet about research projects, 
methods and equipment of the 
group and the like. 
In the following quotation the inter-
viewer used information about collabo-
ration from the interviewee’s PhD the-
sis: 
Q: You wrote in your PhD that the general 
thing, doing time lapse studies, has 
been done before, but not with the ob-
ject that you were studying. Is that 
right? 
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A: Yes, that’s right. There was a lot of early 
work in grasshoppers, which have huge 
neurons, just massive, and they are very 
easy to do, bring a needle down and in-
ject them. And it’s all very clear what 
the cell is doing in the grasshopper be-
cause everything is so big (…).  
In his much longer answer, the inter-
viewed biologist provided detailed in-
formation about the field and the posi-
tion of his research in it, the reasons 
why he did follow this line of research, 
and about the specific methodological 
problems he has to deal with. The in-
formed question and the reference to 
his PhD triggered the hoped-for re-
sponse. 
It is also useful to study posters often 
located in front of the working rooms 
and labs in the time directly prior to 
the interview. This sometimes makes it 
easier to start the informal talk with 
scientists, which leads into the inter-
view. If the opportunity occurs we visit 
the interviewee’s laboratory (we often 
get invited to a lab tour after the inter-
view). This is an excellent opportunity 
to enhance one’s understanding of the 
science, e.g. by getting a graphical im-
age of the equipment and how it is 
used, and by obtaining additional ex-
planations of the laboratory practice.  
A third strategy we developed recently 
is analysing the interviewee’s publica-
tions. This method circumvents the 
difficulties of understanding the sci-
ence by bibliometrically analysing 
structural properties of the inter-
viewee’s oeuvre. The results can be 
visualised as ‘bibliometric research 
trails’ – evolving networks of publica-
tions -, which we used to discuss the 
content of the interviewee’s research as 
it unfolded over time (Gläser and 
Laudel 2007). While bibliometric 
analyses are a useful additional tool for 
understanding a respondent’s re-
search, they cannot replace the under-
standing of content – without having 
some idea about the content of the 
science, we would not even understand 
what the structure means. 
 
4.3 Negotiating the level of com-
munication 
Each interview begins with a phase of 
implicit negotiations. Part of these 
negotiations is that the interviewer 
suggests a vocabulary for the pidgin, 
which is changed by the interviewee’s 
responses. In this introductory phase, 
while it is being negotiated what tech-
nical terms can be used by the scien-
tists so they are properly understood 
by the interviewer, it is simultaneously 
negotiated how ‘scientific’ explanations 
may be in order to be understood. This 
negotiation phase has been experi-
enced by Zuckerman:  
“Intensive preparation brings growing fa-
miliarity with the technical language de-
ployed by the laureates. In the early phase 
of most interviews, the laureates tried to 
avoid the use of language I might not un-
derstand. When given cues that they would 
be understood – particularly by my using 
such terms –they relaxed and their vocabu-
lary more closely approximated their usual 
one. (…) 
The scientific language as well as the trade 
vernacular was used to convey the sense 
that the laureate was not talking to a total 
alien. It was not intended to convey ex-
pertedness on the part of the interviewer 
and did not seem to be perceived as such an 
attempt.” (Zuckerman 1972: 170) 
The introductory phase of the follow-
ing interview (from the project on East 
German basic research) is an instruc-
tive example of carelessness in the ne-
gotiation phase. The interviewer had 
done his homework but blunders in the 
introduction by asking shallow ques-
tions and downplaying his preparation: 
Q: The first question is: What are you cur-
rently working at, that means, your de-
partment? I have read a bit in your 
yearly report, but I am a layperson in 
physics. What I have found out is that 
you are dealing with laser physics. 
A:  Yes. 
Q: And, if I understood it correctly, pri-
marily with the development of meth-
ods? 
A: Yes. And application of these methods. 
Q: And application of these methods, too? 
A:  Yes, yes. It is of course the question how 
precise an answer you want. When you 
say you are a layperson, then it is of 
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course not really important for your in-
vestigation what we do in detail, but 
probably only a rough description. 
Q: Yes. 
A:  It is of a basic character and indeed 
aimed at the further development of 
certain methods of laser spectroscopy, 
which can reveal very fast processes in 
molecules. (…) But it is basic investiga-
tions, first steps, which are investigated. 
When we had nanoseconds it turned 
out that the fastest reactions appeared 
to take nanoseconds. You know what a 
nanosecond is?  
The interviewer presented himself 
twice as a rather uniformed layperson 
and was consequently treated by the 
interviewee as such. The interviewee 
considered details of his work as un-
important to the interviewer and ex-
plained his works as simple as possi-
ble. This created a problem for the 
interviewer who needed detailed de-
scriptions of the scientists work to an-
swer his sociological research question. 
Thus, he had to repair the damage in 
the subsequent phase of the interview 
in order to get the appropriate level of 
communication. 
In the following example, the inter-
viewer starts with the very general 
question without indicating her knowl-
edge about the communication’s sub-
ject. She is being treated as a layper-
son, and the communication begins at 
this level. However, the interviewer 
begins a negotiation, which raises the 
level at which communication takes 
place.  
Q: What is your research field and since 
when have you been working on it? 
A:  Well, you are not a natural scientist. 
How precise would you like to know it? 
My research field is biochemistry of the 
neural system, neural chemistry as it is 
called. I have been working on it for a 
long time … Biochemistry of the neural 
system concerns the signal processing 
and signal transmission by certain pro-
tein molecules, which are called recep-
tors. 
Q: And your special object of investigation 
is the acetylcholine receptor. 
A:  This is a receptor that acquires neural 
impulses and transforms them into an 
effect.  
By informing her interviewee that she 
knew about the acetylcholine receptor, 
the interviewer signalled that technical 
terms could be used in the interview, 
and began to move the interview to a 
level of more detailed descriptions of 
research processes. Later in the inter-
view, the interviewee without hesita-
tion used his technical language to 
describe the emergence of collabora-
tions. 
 (...) If I remember correctly, we had 
several plans at this time. We primarily 
investigate structures. One assumes 
that these biologically important mole-
cules - such a receptor – can be under-
stood if its spatial structure is under-
stood. And we talked to the X’s Group, 
which consists of very good crystallog-
raphers, about how we crystallize this 
thing. (…) This was a starting point for 
trying this together with them.  
Our final example demonstrates a bet-
ter introductory phase, namely a truly 
informed beginning of the interview.  
Q: (...) I have looked up in the internet 
what you are working at, what your re-
search field is. And I understood it as 
follows: You conduct surface investiga-
tions of semiconductors and metals and 
aim at a microscopic understanding of 
the interaction of molecules and atoms 
on surfaces. 
A: That is a big part. Another important 
part are organic thin layers, organic 
materials that are deposited on anor-
ganic solid states and reverse, in order 
to make devices. But we are primarily 
concerned with the foundations. This 
belongs to the area of soft matter (…) 
And there we use our technologies for 
advancing the microscopic understand-
ing. 
In this interview, the interviewer be-
gins with a description of the inter-
viewee’s research field as she under-
stood it from information collected 
prior to the interview. In doing so, she 
is trying to communicate the level of 
her understanding of the interviewee’s 
research and the technical terms that 
can be used in the interview. With his 
answer, the interviewee is adapting to 
this level of communication.  
There is also a danger in the inter-
viewer’s self-presentation as scientifi-
cally well informed. Scientists can for-
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get that it is not a colleague they are 
talking to, and can therefore move up 
to a scientific level the interviewer 
cannot understand. Whenever this 
happens, the interviewer must negoti-
ate the level downwards by stating that 
the scientific argumentation was in-
comprehensible. Thus, the aim of these 
negotiations cannot be to pretend an 
understanding that does not exist (e.g. 
to impress the interviewee), because 
the interview can produce useless (be-
cause incomprehensible) scientific 
talk. It is important to achieve a level 
at which the interviewer can still un-
derstand all the dialogue of the inter-
viewee. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Scientifically informed interviewing is 
necessary in science studies because it 
is the only way of understanding what 
our respondents mean when they an-
swer our questions, and because we 
often must use interviews to collect 
data about the content of our respon-
dent’s research. This kind of interview-
ing requires extensive preparation of 
interviews, the construction of an ‘ad 
hoc – pidgin’ for the communication 
during the interview, and the negotia-
tion of an appropriate level of scientific 
depth between the interviewer and the 
interviewee.  
While the necessity of informed inter-
viewing has not been explicitly ques-
tioned, the extent to which interviews 
are prepared scientifically is likely to 
vary. Owing to a lack of material, it is 
impossible to compare naïve and in-
formed approaches to interviewing the 
same way as we have done for observa-
tions in this article. Neither are there 
outspoken advocates of naïve inter-
viewing, nor is it easy to recognise 
studies that applied such an approach. 
Though both, the danger of ‘going na-
tive’ and the danger of shallow ac-
counts of scientific practice are real in 
interview-based studies, too, we can-
not yet discuss them because we do not 
have sufficient information about 
methodologies of science studies, let 
alone links between methodologies and 
results. Judging from results of quanti-
tative studies on the impact of evalua-
tion-based funding on the content of 
research, which are by design forced to 
rely on naïve interviewing, the short-
comings of such an approach may be 
severe (Gläser et al. 2002).  
Since the main purpose of this article is 
to invite readers to a methodological 
discussion and exchange of experi-
ences, we conclude this article by 
pointing out limitations to our ap-
proach. A first limitation is produced 
by specific fields like mathematics or 
theoretical physics. While it was usu-
ally possible for us to understand the 
problems and strategies of experimen-
tal research at some level of simplifica-
tion, we couldn’t achieve a similar 
simplified understanding of the prac-
tices of mathematics and theoretical 
physics. In these fields, simplified de-
scriptions of problems, objects, and 
methods of research appear to be more 
difficult to achieve. We tried, and our 
respondents tried – but in many cases 
‘the collaboration didn’t work’. Thus, it 
seems that some fields can be studied 
only by native observation respectively 
interviewing. 
A second limitation occurs if compara-
tive research across several fields is 
conducted. In this case, the sociologist, 
who of course has the prime task of 
preparing the investigation sociologi-
cally, is endangered by information 
overload. There are limits to a scien-
tific preparation when one has to in-
terview a molecular biologist on Mon-
day, a solid state physicist on Tuesday, 
an electrical engineer on Wednesday 
and a physical chemist on Thursday. 
Acknowledging this problem implies to 
give up the idea that qualitative (semi-
structured) interviews are an ‘easy’ or 
‘quick’ method. One has to invest an 
enormous amount of time in order to 
interview scientists properly. 
A third limitation is that informed in-
terviewing cannot be extended to the 
background knowledge of scientific 
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work that is acquired by systematic 
scientific education and experience. In 
our opinion, the scientific taken-for-
granted assumptions and the tacit 
knowledge cannot be investigated by 
qualitative interviews. The method of 
choice for studying the role of this 
knowledge is ethnographic observa-
tion. The fact that even ethnographic 
observations have their problems here 
(as the comments of ethnographic ob-
servers on the limits of their under-
standing indicate, see 3.2) hints to a 
difference between science studies and 
studies of many other social groups. 
Scientists carry knowledge that is im-
plicitly present and partially communi-
cated but had been acquired by ways 
that are qualitatively different from the 
practices that can be currently ob-
served, and are located outside the 
field under study. Since we cannot in-
vestigate this background, it is not 
clear to what extent we can identify the 
scientific taken-for-granted assump-
tions of scientists unless they are chal-
lenged by the scientists themselves.  
Applying a scientifically informed in-
terviewing strategy even increases the 
danger of not being able to identify 
taken-for-granted assumptions. Our 
respondents might not tell us because 
they think we know. This point has 
been argued in the context of ethno-
graphic methodology. Yes, there is the 
serious danger of not getting certain 
information in an informed interview. 
The interviewee will form assumptions 
about the interviewer, and about what 
the interviewer already knows. There-
fore, informed interviewing increases 
the danger of not being told something 
that should be told because your inter-
viewee thinks you already know this. 
This can be partly helped by careful in-
depth probing during the interview. 
However, there seems to be an un-
avoidable trade-off between not being 
told something because you are as-
sumed to already knowing, on the one 
hand, and not being told because you 
are assumed to being unable to com-
prehend. 
Our methodological discussion is, of 
course, limited by our own experience. 
While some clear patterns exist in our 
interviews, any generalisation requires 
the inclusion of the experiences of as 
many investigators as possible. Given 
the current level of methodological 
discussion on informed interviewing, 
any discussion must start from scratch, 
and doing this with one’s own experi-
ences is not the worst way to begin. 
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